Following MARLIN and SALVO, the armed unmanned surface vessel SANCAR SIDA has officially been inducted into the Turkish Navy’s inventory.[1] Among the various contributions these platforms bring, what sets SANCAR apart is its integration into the ADVENT Network-enabled Combat Management System. For such a system to function effectively, a robust data network capable of supporting unmanned integration is required—a capability only a handful of countries can demonstrate in both their combat management systems and their datalink standardization.
Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia War
Beyond well-known U.S. and NATO datalink solutions, the Russia-Ukraine
conflict provides an invaluable case study. At the outset, few expected
that Ukraine’s unmanned operations would prove so disruptive. Yet their
asymmetric effect has effectively denied Russia’s numerically and qualitatively
superior fleet the freedom of maneuver in the Black Sea.
While Russia has achieved some successes of its own, the Ukrainian
concept of operations has dominated discussion. Each successful strike has
not only demonstrated tactical impact but has also accelerated innovation,
creating momentum for new platforms.
For example, Ukraine recently unveiled the Toloka
TLK-1000 Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV), boasting a range of over 1,000
nautical miles and a length between 4 and 12 meters. This system promises to be
far more lethal than earlier designs such as the Toloka TLK-150 or the Marichka
UUV.
The Starlink Factor
On the surface warfare side, much of Ukraine’s success rests
on a single enabler: Starlink. While not indigenous, this commercial
technology has been weaponized into a major operational advantage. By solving
the core datalink problem with a robust, low-latency system, Ukraine has been
free to address secondary challenges and achieve rapid progress.
Starlink’s relatively low latency and high throughput allow
real-time video streaming, enabling complex tactics such as FPV-style remote
control or launching UAVs directly from USVs. For countries with access to such
low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, this represents a critical
advantage. However, very few states possess their own equivalent networks, and
even Ukraine—benefiting from Western backing—has been warned on multiple
occasions not to use Starlink for military purposes.[2]
Ironically, while Starlink was initially heavily targeted by
Russian electronic warfare, subsequent software upgrades have made it far more
resistant to jamming. Russia, by contrast, cannot exploit Starlink-like systems
and must contend with the limitations of its vulnerable GEO satellites.
Russia’s Adaptation
In Russia’s case, reliance on GEO-based systems and radio
relays creates a structurally weaker communications environment. This became
apparent in its unmanned kamikaze surface vessel operations, notably the
Simferopol attack and the strike on the Zatoka Bridge.
On 28 August 2025, the Ukrainian Laguna-class SIGINT vessel Simferopol was sunk by Russian unmanned systems near the Romanian (NATO) border.[3] While the strike was operationally successful, it underscored Russia’s reliance on less sophisticated communication architectures.
Unlike Ukraine, Russia does not publicize footage from onboard cameras. Instead, its Ministry of Defense has released third-party recordings, making independent analysis more difficult. Still, available evidence suggests that Russian USVs depend on radio links and UAV relays as the backbone of their command and control.
Comparing Doctrines
|
Feature |
Ukraine |
Russia |
|
Datalink & Control |
Starlink as primary backbone, enabling low latency and
high-bandwidth real-time video. Supports FPV-style guidance and drone launch
from USVs. LOS radio links used in short-range scenarios. UAVs occasionally
used as relays. |
Limited SATCOM capability (RS-30M trials); GEO-based
systems with high latency. Heavy reliance on radio control and relays,
vulnerable to jamming. Katran USVs configured with this approach. |
|
Electronic Warfare Resilience |
Multi-layered: SATCOM, radio, and UAV relays combine into
a heterogeneous, robust network. Starlink highly resistant to EW after
upgrades. |
More fragile: single-channel radio + relay easier to jam.
Experimenting with fiber-optic guided USVs, but not widely deployed. |
|
Range & Operational Reach |
Extended by LEO SATCOM + relays, enabling deep
strikes—even inside Sevastopol harbor. Operational endurance limited mainly
by fuel. |
Without SATCOM, range constrained to LOS radio coverage.
Reliant on UAV relays; operations largely confined to coastal waters. |
Strategic Outlook
Although Ukraine currently leads in operational
effectiveness, Russia’s incremental progress may prove more sustainable in the
long run. For Türkiye, observing these contrasting approaches offers invaluable
lessons. Aligning these insights with our own roadmap for unmanned surface
systems—from SANCAR to future concepts—can provide a clearer trajectory for
force development.
References
[1] Doğan News Agency, “SANCAR SIDA Enters Turkish Naval Service after
Successful Firing Test,” Sept 20, 2025.
[2] Navyletters, “Did Russia Copy Ukraine’s Unmanned Surface Vessel?” Feb 19,
2023.
[3] Kommersant, “MoD releases video of attack on Ukrainian ship Simferopol,”
Aug 28, 2025.
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