A Quarter Away From Manned–Unmanned Teaming

 



In recent weeks, it was reported that the SALVO unmanned surface vessel (USV), produced by DEARSAN, was delivered to the Turkish Navy.[1] Together with previously inducted unmanned systems, this represents another step toward the complex reality of manned–unmanned teaming at sea.

Like all platforms, unmanned surface vessels will follow a traditional lifecycle for adaptation and integration. At first they will be employed in unit-level operations, then gradually integrated into naval task groups. Yet it would be a mistake to assume this process will take too long. The trajectory of development suggests that hybrid concepts will mature sooner than many expect.

The Role of Hybrid Task Groups

Unmanned systems will not immediately replace conventional assets. Rather, their initial contribution will be in hybrid groupings—where manned and unmanned elements operate in coordination. Multiple studies have already highlighted this as the most effective path to leveraging unmanned platforms in the near term.[2] In practice, this means USVs will first and foremost serve to support existing naval task groups, extending their reach and situational awareness.

A key reason for the push toward Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is the exhaustion of traditional communication architectures. Conventional datalinks cannot support the level of integration required for seamless unmanned adoption. This reality sets the stage for new operational paradigms.

Operation Overmatch as a Model

In the maritime domain, the U.S. Navy’s Operation Overmatch offers a clear roadmap for integrating unmanned systems into task groups. Once a secretive program, Overmatch now stands at the forefront of every unmanned-related initiative.

The three core principles of Overmatch are:

  1. Network-Centric Operations
  2. Adaptability Through Simulation
  3. Manned–Unmanned Teaming

When it was launched, Overmatch was designated as one of the U.S. Navy’s three top priorities.[3] Its ambition was to ensure that information dominance could compete directly with firepower. With budgets in the billions, Overmatch demands new infrastructure, standardization, and training. At its heart lie artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) as the twin pillars of this transformation.

What makes Overmatch distinctive is its software-first approach. Unlike traditional naval programs that prioritize hardware, Overmatch treats hardware as secondary to the software-defined network and data architecture.

The Central Role of Data and AI

Many countries are now developing hybrid communication architectures to enable distributed naval operations. Yet the Overmatch data architecture remains more ambitious: it pools data from all sensors and platforms, fuses it in a central repository, and applies AI algorithms for real-time analysis. The output is then distributed via cloud networks—placing immense stress on data flows between deployed units and data centers.

This makes the question less about the headlines of the concept, which are already familiar, and more about the approach used to implement them. Applied to unmanned systems, it is clear that AI emerges as the critical enabler. If employed correctly, USVs can evolve beyond remote-controlled “toys” into intelligent assets that expand the reconnaissance and striking power of task groups.

Given the remarkable progress of contemporary AI across all sectors, it is evident that AI-enabled combat management and C2 applications will leap forward on such a data-rich backbone. But with this advantage comes uncertainty: AI will be a force multiplier in the battlespace, yet it introduces unknowns for both friend and foe.

The Road Ahead

In the near future, naval operations may see autonomous “duels” between unmanned systems. Unlike traditional command cycles, decisions and responses will be modeled and executed at digital speed—with AI analyzing every data flow and adjusting the operational picture in real time.

Players with this capability will enjoy a decisive advantage. Yet the ultimate question remains: can the results be manipulated? The risks of over-reliance on autonomous decision-making are as significant as the opportunities.


References
[1] GöktuÄź Efil, “SALVO SIDA in the Turkish Naval Inventory,” MILDEFIN, Aug 28, 2025.
[2] Bryan Clark & Dan Patt, “Hedging Bets: Rethinking Force Design for a Post-Dominance Era,” Hudson Institute, Feb 2024.
[3] Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Navy Dedicates More Resources to Secretive Project Overmatch,” National Defense, Oct 8, 2021.

 

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